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Abstract 
Understanding whether the elderly are saving adequately is fundamental to  understanding 
whether elderly households are able to maintain reasonable living standards. One factor that 
affects wealth accumulation is the extent to which parents need to support children and the extent 
to which children need to support parents. The presence of Social Security may affect 
intergenerational transfers, but the extent to which it ‘crowds out’ transfers from parents to 
children is controversial. The ideal dataset to analyze these issues would have detailed 
information on two or three generations and measures of long range outcomes of parents and 
their children. The Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS) offers a possibility to analyze the 
impact of transfer patterns on wealth accumulation.  We look at transfers over a long time period, 
informed by different theories of transfer behavior, as well as how cognitive skills and other 
attributes earlier in the life-cycle influence transfer and saving behavior later on in life. Long-
term transfers are less equally distributed across siblings than short-term transfers, and the sum 
of transfers and inheritances is less equally distributed than transfers and inheritances alone. 
Transfers from parents-in-law are positive but statistically insignificantly correlated with the 
amount of transfers received from one’s own parents.  Inter-vivos transfers from parents are not 
affected by transfers from parents-in-law. We find a strong positive association between the 
incidence of giving to own children and having received a gift from own parents, conditional on 
income and net worth.  
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Introduction 
Determining the adequacy of savings is fundamental for understanding the well-being of elderly 
households. One factor that affects wealth accumulation is the extent to which parents need to 
support children and the extent to which children need to support parents. The presence of social 
security has long been known to affect intergenerational transfers but the extent to which it 
‘crowds out’ transfers from parents to children is controversial. The ideal dataset to analyze 
issues pertaining to the long-run determinants of intergenerational transfers would have detailed 
information on two or three generations as well as measures of long range outcomes of parents 
and their children. The Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS) offers a possibility to analyze the 
impact of transfer patterns on wealth accumulation and has been unexplored.  
The recent financial crisis had a large impact on economic well-being. It affected those nearing 
or in retirement and young households who faced a more difficult time in the labor market. With 
our data, we plan to look at the impact of this financial crisis on transfers from parents to 
children. If retirees, who have already experienced large declines in their financial capabilities, 
have the additional burden of supporting their children, the economic impact would be even 
larger than previously thought. On the flip side, with rising health care costs, retirees may be 
unable to transfer resources to their adult children and may even rely more on them to maintain 
their standard of living in retirement. Understanding the effects of transfers and the determinants 
of transfers is of importance. The impact of transfers from one’s parents on transfers to others 
(the degree of crowding out) is an important parameter that is prominently featured in public 
policy discussions. Furthermore, if there are long-range determinants of transfers (for instance, if 
kids receive more transfers, do they transfer more to their children all else equal; are there other 
factors that would lead parents to transfer resources regardless of economic circumstances), these 
determinants are useful to policy makers to gauge the effect of changes in the social security 
system on the well-being of the elderly. 
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Models of transfers 
Straightforward extensions of cooperative models to altruistic families with more than one child 
predict that transfers are compensatory.  That is, transfers from parents to children will be 
negatively correlated with children’s income.1  Empirical studies on this topic are generally 
motivated in two ways.  First, exchange and altruism are competing models of transfers within 
the family.  If transfers are motivated by the exchange of goods, services, affection or some other 
act valued by donors, they may be positively correlated with the child’s income (Bernheim, 
Shleifer, and Summers, 1985; Cox, 1987; Cox and Rank, 1992; Brown, 2002; but also see 
Perozek, 1998).  Higher income on the child’s part may increase the “price” the donor must pay 
to induce the recipient to respond.  Under the altruistic model, transfers are given to maximize 
the utility of the extended family (Becker, 1974, 1991).  A simple implication of the altruistic 
model is that transfers will be inversely related to children’s income. 
1 It is also straightforward to develop noncooperative models that predict transfers will be compensatory across 
families, holding other things equal.  Predictions about transfers within two-child families in the noncooperative 
framework are more complicated. 
 
Several papers document the fact that, for more than 80 percent of the population, bequests are 
equally distributed among children (Menchik, 1980, 1988; Wilhelm, 1996; McGarry, 1999).  
This pattern seems inconsistent with simple models of altruism.  The result for bequests is 
particularly puzzling, given that abundant evidence on inter vivos transfers finds patterns 
consistent with compensatory transfers (see, for example, Dunn and Phillips, 1997; Hochguertel 
and Ohlsson, 2000; McGarry, 1999, 2000a; McGarry and Schoeni, 1995, 1997).  Bernheim and 
Severinov (2003) develop a model that reconciles these factschildren care about the extent to 
which they are valued and cannot directly observe their parent’s preferences.  Bequests are 
readily observable signals of parents’ affection.  For appropriate parameter values in Bernheim 
and Severinov’s model, any fraction of the population will divide bequests equally, even when 
some parents in the population love their children unequally.  Because inter vivos transfers may 
be unobservable, they may be unequally divided among children, but it is not fully clear that they 
are. 
 
                                                                
Many previous studies that show a negative relationship between inter vivos transfers and 
children’s income have a potentially serious flaw in that they measure transfers over a one- or 
two-year period.2 It is possible that sibling differences in the receipt of inter vivos transfers over 
a short time even out over longer periods.  The WLS provides transfer data over respondents’ 
adult lives.  This information, and a second feature of the WLS datadetailed interviews with a 
random sibling of the primary WLS respondentgive us the ability to examine the degree of 
equality among inter vivos transfers over long periods of time.  The WLS has other unique data 
items, such as IQ test scores for respondents. These data can better measure the economic status 
of transfer recipients.  The WLS also offers a rare opportunity to tally transfers between three 
generations.  Comparison of transfer patterns from parents to children and from children to 
grandchildren should provide valuable new information about transfer dynamics within families. 
 
Distinguishing between altruism and exchange models has more than academic importance.  If 
transfers are consistent with predictions from the altruistic model, increases (decreases) in social 
security or in public transfers through TANF, food stamps, unemployment insurance, or other 
means-tested transfers will decrease (increase) inter vivos transfers.  In this case, government 
payments may substitute for within-family transfers.  If families are more efficient than 
government in caring for their members or if the government safety net weakens family 
relationships, public policies that reduce intergenerational transfers may reduce family well-
being.  If instead the exchange motive or other norms for transfers (such as equal division) 
dominate, government payments are less likely to crowd out inter vivos transfers and, in the case 
of exchange, they may actually increase them. 
 
  
2 Respondents in the Assets and Health Dynamics Study are asked whether they gave $5,000 or more over the last 
ten years.  Recent important work using multiple waves of the Health and Retirement Study aggregates repeated 
transfer questions to partially address this limitation (McGarry, 2013). 
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The WLS Data 
The WLS is a long-term study of a random sample of 10,317 men and women who graduated 
from Wisconsin high schools in 1957 and of their randomly selected brothers and sisters.  Data 
were collected from the original respondents or their parents in 1957, 1964, 1975, 1992, 2004 
and 2011.  The WLS has enjoyed high rates of response and sample retention.  The data provide 
a full record of social background, youthful aspirations, schooling, military service, family 
formation, labor market experiences, and social participation of the original respondents.  In 
1977, the study design was expanded with the collection of parallel interview data for a highly 
stratified subsample of 2,429 siblings of the primary respondents.  In the 1993 wave, the sample 
was further expanded to include a randomly selected sibling of every respondent, for a total of 
8,732 siblings.  The survey content was also extended to obtain detailed occupational histories 
and job characteristics; marital histories; incomes, assets, and interhousehold transfers; social 
and economic characteristics of parents, siblings, and children, and descriptions of the 
respondents' relationships with them; and extensive information about physical and mental 
health, personality and religious practices.  The WLS participants were also matched with their 
school and public records, yielding reliable measures mortality, IQ (the 11th grade Henmon-
Nelson score), school performance, school activities and attractiveness.  The latter has been 
analyzed thoroughly in Scholz and Sicinski (2012).  
 
New waves of WLS data were collected from the surviving primary respondents (in 2003 and 
2011) and their randomly selected siblings (in 2004 and 2011) that update all information 
collected in the 1992 and 1993 surveys, and augments information from primary respondents and 
their selected siblings with detail about their relations with immediate family members.  With 
these longitudinal multigenerational data, we are able to examine family relations involving two 
distinct sets of intergenerational pairings: (a) relations between the respondents and their aging 
parents, (b) relations between the respondents and their own children, as well as (c) relations 
between respondents and their siblings.  Unlike the HRS (and other studies that overlap with the 
WLS cohort), in which information on siblings has been collected indirectly (i.e., from the 
primary respondents), the WLS provides more extensive, self-reported data from a randomly 
selected sibling, thus facilitating the statistical control of potentially important, yet unobserved, 
family-specific characteristics.   
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In the 1992, 1993 and later WLS surveys, respondents and selected siblings were asked to report 
whether they had received financial transfers greater than $1,000 from their parents or parents-
in-law.  If so, information was collected regarding the source of the transfer (mother, parents, 
father-in-law, etc.), the amount, the year, and the reason for the transfer.  Possible reasons 
included: down payment for home, to increase wealth or reduce debt, payments for housing or 
other living expenses, educational expenses, or to spend any way the recipient wanted.   
 
Respondents and siblings are also asked to report monetary transfers made to their parents and 
children since 1975, resulting in a record of transfer payments from 1975 to 2011.  Prior to 2002, 
information on the children of respondents is somewhat limited.  Additional information on the 
children of the respondents is collected in the more recent data so we can now examine transfers 
across all three generations.  The WLS information is unique for a large-scale, federally 
supported survey and is well suited for examination of the correlates of transfer receipt.   
 
Sample selection 
The analyses presented in this paper involve sibling comparisons.  Consequently, our sample is 
limited to families with two or more children.  Among those, we only retain full and half sibling 
pairs, as differential treatment of adopted or step children, if present, could confound our results.  
We further limit the sample to siblings that are less than 15 years apart in age. The motivation for 
this is twofold.  First, having siblings at roughly the same life stage assures that their financial 
needs are comparable (for example, both face educational or child rearing expenses).  Second, 
we have no way to adjust the gift amounts for inflation and in the case of large sibling age 
differences, the monetary value of conceptually identical gifts, like college tuition, could be 
significantly different.  Finally, we exclude cases where one of the siblings has not responded to 
any of the three survey waves where data on family transfers was collected.  After applying all of 
the above criteria we assemble a subset of the WLS data that includes 4,919 sibling pairs. Table 
A1 in the appendix reports the summary statistics of the sample we use.  
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Descriptive Patterns of Intergenerational Transfers  
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Intergenerational Transfers 
  Average value % > 0 
Average value 
 excluding 0 Sample size 
Lifetime transfers from parents 
Graduates 9455.82 24.9 41751.07 4879 
Siblings 5418.42 25.82 24797.73 4842 
Total 7444.8 25.36 33458.59 9721 
Lifetime transfers to parents 
Graduates 444.26 3.43 14684.46 4892 
Siblings 369.33 3.33 13962.45 4839 
Total 407 3.38 14349.62 9731 
Transfers from children since 2004 
Graduates 301.31 1.31 23495.53 3509 
Siblings 117.03 1.24 9697.3 3066 
Total 215.38 1.28 17269.5 6575 
Transfers to children since 2004 
Graduates 17510.55 42.19 43080.15 3496 
Siblings 15001.92 38.99 39475.34 3055 
Total 16340.68 40.7 41459.25 6551 
Lifetime transfers to children 
Graduates 40697.75 75.2 57626.7 4895 
Siblings 28231.98 65.9 47652.51 4851 
Total 34493 70.57 53098.85 9746 
 
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics. As reported in table 1, transfers in our sample 
overwhelmingly flow in one direction: from parents to children.  While over 25 percent of 
respondents reported receiving at least one transfer from parents, only 3.38 percent have ever 
made transfers to their parents by 2011.  The pattern repeats itself when looking down one 
generation.  In the 2011 round of interviews just 1.28 percent of respondents have received a 
monetary gift from a child since 2004.  At the same time, over 40 percent of them have made 
such gifts to their adult children during this period of time.  This figure rise to 70 percent when 
we look at lifetime transfers to children.  A similar picture emerges when transfer amounts are 
considered.  Conditional on receiving a parental transfer, graduates got about $42K and siblings 
got about $25K on average.  The mean gift in the reverse direction, when it occurred, amounted 
to about $14K for both the graduates and their siblings.  Looking down one generation this 
pattern of giving and receiving also holds.  Graduates gave their children an average of $43K and 
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received $23K, conditional on a transfer being made between 2004 and 2011.  For siblings the 
corresponding amounts were about $39K and $10K.  As noted above, the likelihood of a parent 
receiving a gift from a child over that time period is very small.  This becomes apparent when 
looking at the unconditional means.  Since 2004, the average sample member received $215 
from his/her children while passing along $16K to the kids. 
 
Results 
We use logit models to study the factors affecting individual decisions on whether to give and to 
receive a transfer and we use linear models to analyze the factors correlated with the amount of 
transfers. The main regression results are reported below in this section. 
Table 2 reports the results of our baseline regressions. Female participants were 25 percent more 
likely to ever receive financial assistance from parents than their male siblings.  The odds of 
receiving a transfer are also higher for younger respondents.  Each additional year of age reduces 
the likelihood of obtaining a transfer by 4.7 percent.  If most transfers occur in early adulthood, 
this could simply reflect recall problems – older participants might have forgotten the help they 
received decades ago.  The alternative explanation is that younger children come of age when the 
parents are at their peak earnings years and have more resources.  Education is another important 
factor affecting transfers.  Each additional year of education is associated with 7.3 percent higher 
odds of receiving parental support.  Finally, parents respond to shocks in family formation 
experienced by their offspring.  Divorce, loss of a spouse and failure to start a family all sharply 
increase the odds of receiving a transfer.  Interestingly, none of the above characteristics appears 
to significantly influence the amount transferred.  What triggers a transfer and how much is 
given are not determined by the same factors.   
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Table 2 Baseline Regressions of Transfer Giving and Receiving 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Sample Year 1992/1993 2004/2005 
Transfer from 
parents ever 
(prob.) 
Transfer from 
parents ever 
(value) 
Transfer to 
children ever 
(prob.) 
Transfer to 
children ever 
(value) Dependent Variable 
Female 1.251*** 
(0.109) 
1032.480 
(2005.344) 
0.952 
(0.106) 
-22983.316** 
(11002.026) 
Year of birth 1.047*** 
(0.010) 
165.871 
(216.638) 
0.981 
(0.011) 
-898.203 
(1210.389) 
Education (years) 1.073*** 
(0.024) 
-217.975 
(527.551) 
1.163*** 
(0.037) 
3276.339 
(2796.844) 
Divorced 1.747*** 
(0.253) 
2743.763 
(3240.768) 
0.596*** 
(0.108) 
-17790.883 
(18176.030) 
Widowed 1.590* 
(0.412) 
-544.682 
(5710.827) 
0.851 
(0.166) 
-5163.640 
(19854.194) 
Never married 1.778*** 
(0.375) 
1699.146 
(4968.759) 
0.088** 
(0.093) 
-8245.393 
(70399.890) 
Constant 
 
-3170.789 
(12208.321)  
-11999.633 
(72046.239) 
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.096 0.001 0.152 0.007 
Sample size 9417 2474 7330 1674 
 
a) Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
b) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
c) Coefficients in columns 1 and 3 are odds ratios from logit regressions. 
d) All models also include indicator variables for completing each of the survey waves.  Models in columns 
3 and 4 also contain a dummy for having a child with serious mental or developmental disabilities. 
Analogous models for lifetime inter vivos transfers to the participants’ children complement this 
picture.  We do not observe significant gender differences in giving patterns among siblings and 
we don’t see any effects of age.  More educated siblings transfer money to their kids more 
frequently.  Those that experienced divorce are a full 40 percent less likely to give anything to 
their children.  This might reflect financial strain that often follows the dissolution of marriage.  
However, it is also possible that divorce creates tension between children and parents, who in 
turn experience diminished utility from making transfers.      
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The exceptionally rich set of personal attributes available in the WLS allows us to look at many 
previously unexplored correlates of transfers.  Table 3 reports the correlation between these 
factors and the incidence and amount of intergenerational transfers. 
Table 3 Extended Regressions of Transfer Giving and Receiving 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Sample Year 1992/1993 2004/2005 
Transfer from 
parents ever 
(prob.) 
Transfer from 
parents ever 
(value) 
Transfer to 
children ever 
(prob.) 
Transfer to 
children ever 
(value) Dependent Variable 
Birth order 0.826*** 
(0.061) 
-539.810 
(1451.323) 
1.079 
(0.087) 
-9476.858 
(8002.242) 
Number of children 1.021 
(0.030) 
-37.888 
(640.526) 
1.035 
(0.034) 
4712.760 
(3409.066) 
Household income 
($1000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
-8.737* 
(5.144) 
0.999 
(0.001) 
70.424*** 
(15.392) 
Net worth ($1000) 1.000 
(0.000) 
-5.729*** 
(1.012) 
1.001*** 
(0.000) 
23.693*** 
(2.289) 
IQ 1.037 
(0.064) 
-99.420 
(1500.857) 
1.193** 
(0.094) 
7035.619** 
(3507.233) 
IQ conditional on 
income/wealth 
1.028 
(0.065) 
92.591 
(1623.298) 
1.166* 
(0.095) 
7912.146** 
(3494.878) 
Extraversion 1.038 
(0.067) 
935.596 
(1789.640) 
1.186** 
(0.099) 
-10731.578 
(6844.252) 
Agreeableness 0.946 
(0.063) 
1343.888 
(1891.303) 
0.907 
(0.071) 
-3769.290 
(7100.483) 
Conscientiousness 0.873** 
(0.056) 
-2572.155 
(1819.353) 
1.148* 
(0.090) 
1337.376 
(6898.177) 
Neuroticism 0.926 
(0.059) 
594.011 
(1836.657) 
0.918 
(0.079) 
1016.634 
(7152.039) 
Openness 0.910 
(0.062) 
282.863 
(1910.985) 
1.059 
(0.094) 
17121.629** 
(7458.419) 
 
a) Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
b) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
c) Coefficients in columns 1 and 3 are odds ratios from logit regressions. 
d) All independent variables in table 1 are also included in the regressions above. 
 
In the 1975 interview graduate respondents were asked to provide basic demographic 
information on all living siblings, which allows for the construction of a birth order measure.  
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We find that birth order significantly affects the likelihood of receiving money from parents.  
Having an additional older sibling lowers the odds of receiving a transfer by 17 percent.  The 
amount of transfer is also lower in such case, although the estimate is not statistically significant.  
Birth order is not significantly correlated with decisions on whether and how much to give to 
their children.   
 
In 1992/3 the study participants listed all children that they consider part of their family.  The 
participants’ parents do not appear to give more support to kids that produced more offspring. 
Respondents with more children are no more likely to make transfers to their kids or transfer 
more money. 
 
In every wave of the survey participants were asked about their sources of income and various 
types of assets that they own.  Due to a large number of missing reports in these variables we opt 
to use imputed measures of household income and net worth provided by the WLS.  
Respondents’ income and wealth do not factor into the parents’ decision on whether or not to 
make a transfer.  However, conditional on receiving parental transfers, the amount received is 
reduced by 0.87 cents for every dollar of his or her household income.  This sensitivity of 
transfers to financial success also extends to respondents’ net worth, where it’s found that one 
more dollar of net worth reduces the amount of parental transfers by about 0.57 cents.  Not 
surprisingly, we observe much stronger effects of income and wealth when looking at the 
transfers that respondents made to their children. Here, an additional dollar of income reported in 
the 2004/5 round of interviews translates into an extra 7 cents passed down to children. The 
corresponding figure for net worth is 2.4 cents.  Net worth also plays a role in determining the 
likelihood of a transfer to own children, but the magnitude of this effect is relatively small – the 
odd rises by about 1 percent for every additional 10 thousand of net worth.  
 
The WLS has an exceptionally complete measure of ability.  A major lookup effort in 1996 led 
the study to locate some version of the Henmon-Nelson test for every graduate respondent.  
Depending on the source, the scores were later normalized to assure inter person comparability.  
In 1993 sibling respondents were asked detailed information about the high school that they last 
attended.  Attempts to retrieve test scores based on these reports were successful for 84 percent 
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of siblings in our sample.  We observe no association between the respondent’s IQ and either the 
incidence or amount of parental transfers received.  However, raising IQ by one point improves 
the odds of giving to own children by 1.9 percent and increases total transfers by 703.6 dollars.  
Given the well-documented relationship between IQ and economic success, we also looked at a 
specification that controlled for income and wealth.  This additional conditioning had little effect 
on the results. 
 
Personality in the WLS is assessed through a 29-question abbreviated version of the 44-question 
“big five personality” inventory.3  Four dimensions – extroversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, and openness – are each assessed with 6 questions.  Neuroticism is assessed 
with 5 questions.  Typical questions are exemplified by the items used to assess extroversion, 
such as “To what extent do you agree that you see yourself as someone who is full of energy?”  
Or “To what extent do you agree that you see yourself as someone who tends to be quiet?”  
Respondents are asked to rate themselves on a 1 (agree strongly) to 6 (disagree strongly) scale 
for each of the various underlying questions.  The single-item responses are then coded into 
average scores. Among these five personality measures, conscientiousness is the only one that is 
statistically significant correlated with the likelihood of receiving a transfer from parents.  An 
additional point on the conscientiousness scale reduces the odds of getting a transfer by 12.7 
percent. When transfers to own children are considered, conscientiousness is also significant, but 
here the effect is positive – it raises the odds of making a transfer by 14.8 percent.  Giving 
behavior is also influenced by extraversion, a point increase in which raises the odds of making a 
gift to children by 18.6 percent. 
 
Now that the factors affecting the decisions of intergenerational transfers are discussed, we can 
move on to test several hypotheses. We turn to these in the next section. 
  
3 Mueller and Plug (2006) describe the WLS personality measures and examine the links between personality and 
WLS earnings in 1992 for men and women.  They report measures for Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities of 0.76 for 
extroversion, 0.71 for agreeableness, 0.66 for conscientiousness, 0.77 for neuroticism, and 0.60 for openness.  
Accounting for the smaller set of questions underlying the personality trait scores, the reliability ratings are very 
similar to those found in other datasets. 
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Specific questions 
The WLS provides valuable new information related to patterns of transfers within the family.  
First, we will systematically assess the degree to which the implications of empirical transfer 
models differ when estimated over longer time intervals relative to shorter time intervals.  One 
might expect transfers to be more equally distributed over longer time periods, where potential 
recipients have had a greater chance to marry, buy a house, or have children.  We can also 
examine whether the sum of inheritances and inter vivos transfers are more or less equally 
distributed than inter vivos transfers alone, using the WLS data on respondents and a selected 
sibling. 
 
Calculating inheritances from parents in the WLS poses some challenges.  The two main 
problems are double reporting and absence of data on who gave the inheritance in the 1992/3 
wave and sampling of that question in the 2003/4 wave.  In order to increase sample size we 
matched the inheritance date (which was asked of everyone) with the date of death of the 
parents.  We allowed for recall error by using a four year window (one year before the death of a 
parent and two years after).  Following that assignment we counted all inheritances from parents 
reported across time.  When we encountered multiple reports of an inheritance from the same 
person, we followed an elaborate set of rules aimed at retaining the most reliable report.  The 
final analysis data contains at most one inheritance from each parent. 
 
We take two approaches to gain insight into how inter vivos transfers, inheritances and the sum 
of the two (total transfers) are distributed.  The first involves categorizing each of the three 
transfer variables into six brackets, lowest of which was no transfer and the highest being 
transfers in excess of $100,000.  We cross-tabulate these categorical variable for graduates and 
siblings.  If total transfers are more equally distributed than transfers alone, we would expect 
more elements on the diagonal of the tabulation table.  Instead, in table 4, we see the opposite 
pattern.  The sum of cell frequencies along the diagonal is highest for transfers received from 
parents until 1992/93 (73 percent), lower for transfers received over the respondent’s lifetime (68 
percent), yet lower for the value of inheritances received (57 percent) and finally lowest for total 
transfers (46 percent). In the second approach we construct the coefficient of variation for the 
transfer amounts reported by the graduate and the sibling and count how often these two reports 
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are “close” to each other.  Specifically, we count any pair of reported transfers with a coefficient 
of variation less than 0.25 as close.  The intuition behind this method is that measurement and 
recall error can be substantial, but also likely proportional to the amounts involved (70K and 90K 
might be close, but 5K and 25K are not).  This approach eliminates the need to choose arbitrary 
ranges, as is the case for the tabulation discussed above.  The results for this approach 
corroborate the earlier finding. 70 percent of 1992/3 transfers are close, followed by 64 percent 
of lifetime transfers, 54 percent of inheritances and 43 percent of total transfers.  
In summary, it seems that long-term transfers are less equally distributed across siblings than 
short-term transfers and the sum of transfers and inheritances is less equally distributed than 
transfers and inheritances alone. 
 
 
Table 4 Distribution of Parental Transfers Received By Graduates and Siblings 
Transfers by 1992 
Received by graduates Received by 
siblings 0 0-5K 5-10K 10-25K 25-50K 50-100K 100K+ Total 
0 70.47 4.87 1.71 1.66 0.79 0.3 0.12 79.93 
0-5K 7.05 1.32 0.65 0.2 0.2 0.05 0.02 9.49 
5-10K 2.33 0.67 0.4 0.35 0.1 0.12 0.02 4 
10-25K 2.16 0.57 0.22 0.35 0.32 0.07 0.02 3.73 
25-50K 0.87 0.25 0.2 0.22 0.2 0.12 0.02 1.89 
50-100K 0.32 0.02 0.07 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.67 
100K+ 0.15 0 0 0.02 0 0.05 0.07 0.3 
Total 83.36 7.7 3.25 2.91 1.66 0.77 0.35 100 
Transfers over the lifetime 
0 64.6 6.14 2.5 2.46 1.31 0.81 0.29 78.11 
0-5K 6.23 1.44 0.79 0.31 0.23 0.04 0.04 9.08 
5-10K 2.6 0.67 0.5 0.37 0.21 0.12 0 4.48 
10-25K 2.02 0.48 0.35 0.6 0.54 0.1 0.06 4.16 
25-50K 0.98 0.31 0.12 0.29 0.4 0.17 0.1 2.37 
50-100K 0.44 0.04 0.08 0.19 0.08 0.12 0.06 1.02 
100K+ 0.42 0 0.02 0.06 0 0.04 0.23 0.77 
Total 77.28 9.08 4.37 4.29 2.77 1.42 0.79 100 
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Table 4 Continued 
Inheritances received 
Received by 
siblings 
Received by graduates 
 Total 0 0-5K 5-10K 10-25K 25-50K 50-100K 100K+ 
0 47.29 1.89 2.41 4.86 3.91 2.47 2.14 64.97 
0-5K 1.64 0.6 0.19 0.35 0.08 0.12 0.06 3.05 
5-10K 1.95 0.21 0.69 0.69 0.31 0.08 0.08 4.01 
10-25K 4.01 0.25 0.71 2.72 1.21 0.48 0.15 9.52 
25-50K 3.18 0.1 0.25 1.06 2.2 1.12 0.27 8.19 
50-100K 1.83 0.08 0.04 0.23 0.93 1.23 0.73 5.07 
100K+ 1.56 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.44 0.73 2.22 5.19 
Total 61.46 3.2 4.34 10.04 9.08 6.23 5.65 100 
Total transfers (lifetime transfers + inheritance) received 
0 0-5K 5-10K 10-25K 25-50K 50-100K 100K+ Total 
0 34.11 4.59 2.75 4.72 3.41 2.19 1.92 53.7 
0-5K 3.89 1.22 0.58 0.91 0.56 0.35 0.33 7.84 
5-10K 2.54 0.58 0.93 0.81 0.52 0.27 0.14 5.79 
10-25K 3.72 0.64 0.95 3.06 1.61 0.79 0.37 11.15 
25-50K 2.65 0.6 0.35 1.49 2.19 1.26 0.5 9.04 
50-100K 1.59 0.27 0.12 0.48 1.16 1.51 0.87 6 
100K+ 1.43 0.27 0.17 0.29 0.54 0.93 2.85 6.47 
Total 49.94 8.17 5.85 11.75 9.99 7.3 6.99 100 
 
Models of parental altruism imply that parents equate the marginal utility of consumption across 
generations. Such models typically unequal transfers across children to compensate their 
differential economic circumstances. 
 
Second, as noted above, bequests appear to be equally distributed.  The primary explanation for 
this phenomenon is that equal division reflects a sense of fairness or equality across children.  
This would arise, for example, in the separable earnings-transfers model of Behrman, Pollak, and 
Taubman (1982), in which the child's earnings enter the parental utility function separately from 
transfers. An implication is that parental transfers are independent of children's earnings.  If these 
sentiments extend to inter vivos transfers, one might expect to see that transfers received from 
parents-in-laws do not crowd out transfers received from one’s own parents.  We will estimate 
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the degree to which transfers from parents-in-laws crowd out transfers from one’s own parents, 
using data from the WLS. 
We run a fixed-effect linear regression of transfers from parents on a basic set of personal 
characteristics and the value of transfers received from parents-in-law.  We run separate 
regressions for the period up to 1992/93 and for lifetime transfers.  From table 5, we can see that 
in both cases the amount of transfers from parents-in-law are positive but statistically 
insignificantly correlated with the amount of transfers received from one’s own parents.  It 
appears that inter-vivos transfers from parents are not affected by transfers from parents-in-law.  
We note that a null finding in this case is inconclusive, since the lack of effect on parental giving 
might simply indicate that transfers from parents-in-law are hard for parents to observe.  This 
explanation is supported by the positive and statistically significant correlation between the 
occurrence of a transfer from parents-in-law and from own parents.  It’s likely that both sets of 
parents observe the need of the respondents and respond with a transfer, but their actions are not 
coordinated. 
Table 5 Parental Transfer and Transfers from Parents-in-law 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
  
Received 
Transfer from 
parents by 1992 
(prob.) 
Ever received 
transfer from 
parents (prob.) 
Transfer from 
parents by 1992 
(value) 
Transfer from 
parents ever 
(value) 
Received gift from 
parents-in-law by 1992 
1.979*** 
(0.296)    
Ever received gifts from 
parents-in-law  
2.166*** 
(0.313)   
Value of gifts from 
parents-in-law by 1992   
0.032 
(0.028)  
Value of gifts from 
parents-in-law ever    
0.006 
(0.015) 
Constant 
  
294.522 
(7113.272) 
-144.708 
(19219.381) 
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.075 0.134 0.002 0.001 
Sample size 1934 1764 8822 7866 
a) Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
b) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
c) Coefficients in columns 1 and 3 are odds ratios from logit regressions. 
d) All independent variables in table 1 are also included in the regressions above. 
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Third, the WLS gathers qualitative information on the reasons respondents allocate resources 
unequally across recipients.  For inheritances received, WLS respondents are asked whether the 
estate was divided “about evenly,” and if it was not, an open-ended question asks for the reason 
for unequal division.  Similarly, for cash gifts given by WLS respondents to their children, 
respondents are asked whether gifts have been divided about evenly among all their children.  
The WLS follows this question by asking, not counting bequests, whether the WLS respondent 
plans on giving all their children about the same amount of financial help.  For those who plan to 
give different amounts, the WLS asks why. Responses to these questions provide new evidence 
on parents’ intentions about financial transfers.  These intentions can then be assessed relative to 
self-reported behavior between 1975 and 2011. Our analysis of these intentions reveals that the 
majority of households divided their estates about evenly and that this has been fairly consistent 
over time. 
The unique structure of the WLS allows us to greatly expand our analysis of factors correlated 
with transfers.  In particular, we have multigenerational data which offers the largest advantage 
relative to other datasets.  It seems possible that transfer behavior is “learned,” in the sense that 
people are more likely to make transfers to children when they received transfers from their own 
parents.  Table 6 investigates this possibility. 
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Table 6 Parental Transfer and the Transfer to Children 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Positive transfers to children Amount of transfers to children 
by 
1992 
by 2004 by 
2011 
ever by 1992 by 2004 by 
2011 
ever 
Dependent  
variable 
Parental 
transfer 
Received by 
1992 1.36** 
 
(0.18) 
 
1.68*** 
(0.25) 
 
0.92 
(0.15) 
     
Received ever 
   
1.42** 
(0.25)     
Amount 
received 
by 1992     
-0.065** 
(0.03) 
-0.185*** 
(0.02) 
-0.043 
(0.08)  
Amount 
received 
ever        
0.02 
(0.06) 
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.088 0.112 0.051 0.211 0.059 0.109 0.007 0.066 
Sample size 2584 1846 1336 1616 7988 6311 5140 7220 
a) Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
b) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
c) Coefficients in columns 1-4 are odds ratios from logit regressions. 
d) All independent variables in table 1 are also included in the regressions above. 
We find a strong positive association between the incidence of giving to own children and 
having received a gift from own parents, conditional on income and net worth.  The odds of 
making a gift to own children rise by 36% in 1992/3 and increase to 68% by 2003/4.  The 
relationship disappears in 2011, indicating that transfers to fully grown and independent children 
may be governed by different motivations. Amount of transfers also depend on the generosity of 
one’s own parents, though here the association is negative in 1992/3 and 2003/4.  By 2011 it 
ceases to be statistically significant and is also not observed for aggregate amounts given.   
It appears that respondents who received financial assistance from parents are more likely to help 
their own kids, but the amounts given are inversely related to the amounts those respondents 
received themselves. This is consistent with the theory of compensatory transfers.  If parents give 
larger transfers to disadvantaged children and those children in turn feel obliged to extend the 
same kindness to their offspring, it is understandable that they would not be able to give as much 
as their better-to-do siblings. 
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 Fifth, the WLS has outstanding data for examining the so-called “strategic” transfer motive.  In 
particular, the survey in 2011 asks the following of the respondent for every child a) frequency of 
contact, b) distance (in miles), c) “how likely are you to ask [name] for help if you need some 
money to help pay your bills,” d) whether the child is making demands, and e) the health of the 
child.  The survey also allows us to identify children with developmental disabilities.  There are 
also specific questions about the respondent’s financial literacy and their attitudes.  These are 
precisely the questions needed to investigate the degree to which transfers are affected by contact 
between children and their parents.  It is also an empirically important matter – almost 60 percent 
of WLS respondents (recall, they are in the early 70s by 2011) are still financially helping their 
children.  Learning more about the magnitude and determinants of these transfers should provide 
valuable insight into better understanding the financial well-being of the elderly and their 
families. 
 
For this analysis we constructed a different sample.  We take all graduates with children 
(regardless of whether they have a sibling or not) and construct variables with the information 
described above for every child that respondent has.  We exclude respondents with children that 
have developmental disabilities or a long-term, serious mental illness.  Subsequently we reshape 
the data so that each child became a separate observation.  The resulting sample has 10,876 
observations from 4,020 families.  As before, we analyze this data using fixed effects models, 
only this time the graduate respondent serves as the grouping variable.   
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 Table 7 Parent-Child Contact and Parental Transfers to Children 
 
Pooled sample Men only Women only 
  probability value probability value probability value 
Child is female 0.819** 
(0.068) 
-
2542.451*** 
(686.528) 
0.755** 
(0.091) 
-
4077.187*** 
(1392.313) 
0.876 
(0.105) 
-
1222.149*** 
(472.817) 
Child is biological 1.373* 
(0.248) 
918.837 
(1483.889) 
1.224 
(0.298) 
1188.411 
(2792.894) 
1.763* 
(0.515) 
980.768 
(1090.924) 
Child is married 0.640*** 
(0.063) 
-1365.580* 
(812.075) 
0.696** 
(0.102) 
-1577.758 
(1649.871) 
0.588*** 
(0.082) 
-945.802* 
(552.935) 
Child DOB 1.004*** 
(0.001) 
1.128 
(6.726) 
1.006*** 
(0.001) 
-1.933 
(13.363) 
1.002 
(0.001) 
4.022 
(4.628) 
Number kids child has 1.120*** 
(0.036) 
89.274 
(206.879) 
1.130** 
(0.056) 
70.631 
(350.294) 
1.126*** 
(0.048) 
100.677 
(175.974) 
Frequency of telephone 
contact 
1.230*** 
(0.066) 
-98.389 
(435.031) 
1.246*** 
(0.102) 
-191.727 
(896.031) 
1.213*** 
(0.089) 
-176.456 
(290.961) 
Frequency of email contact 1.001 
(0.036) 
449.753 
(301.062) 
0.993 
(0.056) 
863.851 
(653.434) 
0.989 
(0.047) 
141.410 
(192.707) 
Frequency of in-person 
contact 
1.024 
(0.044) 
317.089 
(345.682) 
1.041 
(0.067) 
562.257 
(714.674) 
0.993 
(0.059) 
261.424 
(230.481) 
Similarity of outlook on life 0.971 
(0.070) 
430.366 
(593.865) 
1.129 
(0.122) 
194.954 
(1207.965) 
0.867 
(0.087) 
524.530 
(400.131) 
How close to child 1.134 
(0.111) 
417.591 
(791.977) 
1.171 
(0.166) 
1297.050 
(1594.382) 
1.129 
(0.158) 
-332.420 
(537.274) 
Likely to ask child for 
help when sick 
1.006 
(0.054) 
348.422 
(455.625) 
0.969 
(0.077) 
302.968 
(935.135) 
1.030 
(0.078) 
348.635 
(304.260) 
Likely to ask child for 
help with bills 
0.692*** 
(0.033) 
-1038.550** 
(404.987) 
0.612*** 
(0.050) 
-1898.070** 
(917.000) 
0.732*** 
(0.045) 
-505.014** 
(252.691) 
Distance to child (miles) 1.000 
(0.000) 
-1.518*** 
(0.490) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
-2.542*** 
(0.884) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
0.008 
(0.377) 
How loved child makes feel 1.143 
(0.105) 
-293.751 
(733.892) 
1.099 
(0.153) 
-335.114 
(1508.099) 
1.152 
(0.146) 
-53.284 
(491.035) 
How demanding child is 1.677*** 
(0.122) 
1075.493* 
(644.122) 
1.775*** 
(0.182) 
467.497 
(1265.469) 
1.556*** 
(0.166) 
1686.381*** 
(447.089) 
How well child listens 1.139* 
(0.078) 
-15.899 
(576.238) 
1.081 
(0.112) 
-790.456 
(1176.380) 
1.227** 
(0.116) 
423.075 
(386.746) 
How critical child is 0.893* 
(0.061) 
43.010 
(554.540) 
0.725*** 
(0.073) 
355.794 
(1112.307) 
1.064 
(0.100) 
-311.967 
(379.752) 
Child obtained BA degree 0.861 
(0.092) 
251.571 
(881.282) 
0.947 
(0.150) 
995.627 
(1805.569) 
0.804 
(0.118) 
-391.197 
(587.914) 
Child's health 0.911 
(0.055) 
-470.636 
(518.052) 
0.888 
(0.085) 
-644.988 
(1105.839) 
0.922 
(0.073) 
-324.652 
(335.146) 
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Different factors seem to govern the likelihood of giving to children and the amounts given.  
Younger children, biological children, number of grandkids, frequency of telephone contact, how 
well the child listens and how critical child is influence the incidence of giving, but not amount.  
Daughters are less likely to receive gifts and end up receiving less conditional on receiving.  
Same holds for children that are married.  Children that make many demands receive gifts more 
often and also receive more.  Children that live further away receive less.  The most revealing 
item is “help with bills”.  Children that the respondent would turn to for financial help have 
much lower odds of receiving gifts and receive significantly less. Again, the observed patterns 
suggest that transfers are compensatory. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Understanding the determinants of intergenerational transfers is of first order interest not only for 
better understanding the motives behind transfers but also to build models that are well equipped 
to analyze the impact of economic policies. Using data from the WLS, we perform a 
multigenerational analysis of the determinants of transfers. We summarize some of the key 
findings. 
 
We observe no association between the respondent’s IQ and either the incidence or amount of 
parental transfers received.  However, raising IQ by one point improves the odds of giving to 
own children by 1.9 percent and increases total transfers by 703.6 dollars. An additional point on 
the conscientiousness scale reduces the odds of getting a transfer by 12.7 percent. When transfers 
to own children are considered, conscientiousness is also significant, but here the effect is 
positive – it raises the odds of making a transfer by 14.8 percent. 
 
Long-term transfers are less equally distributed across siblings than short-term transfers and the 
sum of transfers and inheritances is less equally distributed than transfers and inheritances alone. 
The amount of transfers from parents-in-law are positive but statistically insignificantly 
correlated with the amount of transfers received from one’s own parents.  It appears that inter-
vivos transfers from parents are not affected by transfers from parents-in-law. 
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We find a strong positive association between the incidence of giving to own children and 
having received a gift from own parents, conditional on income and net worth.  The odds of 
making a gift to own children rise by 36% in 1992/3 and increase to 68% by 2003/4.  
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 Table A1 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Wave Variable Mean SD N 
Graduates 
1957 Female 0.53 0.50 4919 
1957 Year of birth (two digit) 38.86 0.49 4919 
1975 Birth order 2.33 1.66 4917 
1992 Education (years) 13.68 2.31 4894 
1992 Married 0.83 0.37 4892 
1992 Number of children 2.98 1.69 4891 
1992 Household income ($1000,imputed) 86.37 252.23 4894 
1992 Net worth ($1000,imputed) 357.11 1107.08 4894 
2004 Education (years) 13.77 2.35 4201 
2004 Married 0.80 0.40 4346 
2004 Number of children 3.07 1.73 4344 
2004 Household income ($1000,imputed) 88.54 187.56 4165 
2004 Net worth ($1000,imputed) 938.19 2099.41 4153 
1992-2011 Received gift from parents 0.25 0.43 4879 
1992-2011 Value of gifts from parents ($1000) 9.46 191.00 4879 
1992-2011 
Value of inheritance from parents 
($1000) 31.44 241.00 4896 
1992-2011 Gave gifts to children 0.75 0.43 4895 
1992-2011 Value of gifts to children ($1000) 40.70 214.00 4895 
Siblings 
1975 Female 0.52 0.50 4919 
1975 Year of birth (two digit) 40.00 6.38 4919 
1992 Birth order 2.62 1.63 4917 
1993 Education (years) 13.68 2.47 4668 
1993 Married 0.80 0.40 4660 
1993 Number of children 2.90 1.85 4654 
1993 Household income ($1000,imputed) 73.55 144.75 4301 
1993 Net worth ($1000,imputed) 357.49 1292.55 4209 
2005 Education (years) 13.92 2.53 3729 
2005 Married 0.77 0.42 4061 
2005 Number of children 2.93 1.82 3842 
2005 Household income ($1000,imputed) 96.71 426.70 3795 
2005 Net worth ($1000,imputed) 887.02 2665.30 3768 
1993-2011 Received gift from parents 0.26 0.44 4842 
1993-2011 Value of gifts from parents ($1000) 5.42 53.07 4842 
1993-2011 
Value of inheritance from parents 
($1000) 32.03 349.00 4835 
1993-2011 Gave gifts to children 0.66 0.47 4851 
1993-2011 Value of gifts to children ($1000) 28.23 237.00 4851 
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